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Abstract
Byzantine quorum systems provide a widely used abstraction for realizing consensus in a dis-
tributed system prone to Byzantine faults, in which every process has the same failure assumption.
Motivated by the requirements of more flexible trust models in the context of blockchain consensus,
Cachin and Tackmann (OPODIS 2019) introduced asymmetric quorum systems as a generalization of
Byzantine quorum systems, where every process is free to choose which other processes to trust and
which not; this results in a subjective, asymmetric trust assumption. Consensus is arguably one of the
most important notions in distributed computing and also relevant for practical systems. This work
shows how to realize consensus protocols with asymmetric trust. A first protocol works in partially
synchronous systems; it generalizes the consensus algorithm underlying PBFT and uses digital sig-
natures. A second protocol is asynchronous, uses no cryptographic signatures, and achieves optimal
resilience. Randomization is provided through a common coin primitive with asymmetric trust. The
resulting protocols can find application also in other domains.
Key words. Consensus, Quorums, Asymmetric trust, Practical Byzantine fault tolerance, Common coin,
Randomized consensus.
1 Introduction
Consensus solves a fundamental problem in distributed systems in reaching agreement among processes on a com-
mon value from a set of proposed ones. Achieving agreement can be difficult because processes can have faulty
behaviors. Quorum system [4] provide a widely adopted tool in devising consensus protocols. From a classi-
cal view, a quorum system is a collection of subsets of all the processes P , called quorums, such that each pair
of quorums has a non-empty intersection [24]. Malkhi and Reiter [18] introduced a generalization of classical
members-quorum systems called Byzantine quorum systems. These systems became a fundamental primitive for
building resilient distributed systems given a Byzantine fail-prone system defined by a trust assumption. Tradition-
ally, trust assumption has been symmetric where we assume that all processes involved in the system adhere on a
global fail-prone structure. Damga˚rd et al. [9] introduced asymmetric trust assumption, in which every process is
allowed to trust on a subjective failing structure, abandoning a shared view of trust in the system. Motivated by
the requirements of more flexible trust models in the context of blockchain consensus, Cachin and Tackmann [6]
introduced asymmetric Byzantine quorum systems as a generalization of the Byzantine quorum systems under
an asymmetric-trust model. They also implement abstractions of broadcast and shared-memory primitives with
asymmetric quorum systems, paving a way for a new approach in devising more complex algorithms suitable
when processes have subjective failing structures.
In this paper, we define and implement the first consensus protocols with asymmetric trust. In particular,
we describe two related notions: First, asymmetric consensus under partial synchrony, where the system may
be asynchronous and a protocol terminates when there are “long enough” periods during which the system is
synchronous [4]. Our consensus protocol is a modular version of the Byzantine consensus algorithm underlying
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [8] for asymmetric quorum systems. It implements asymmetric weak
Byzantine consensus, a version of consensus with weak validity. Our second protocol works in asynchronous
systems, where there is no known upper bound on message transmission delays, and implements asymmetric strong
Byzantine consensus; the latter is the formulation of Byzantine consensus with strong validity in the asymmetric-
trust model. This protocol is randomized, accesses a common coin [3, 23], and improves on the signature-free
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binary consensus algorithm with optimal resilience of Moste´faoui et al. [21]. Finally, we define and construct a
common coin suitable for the asymmetric-trust model and use it in our randomized consensus algorithm.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related works. System model is
stated in Section 3. We recall and extend main notions on asymmetric quorum systems in Section 4. In Section 5
we define asymmetric weak Byzantine consensus and implement it as a generalization of PBFT consensus. This is
done in a modular way following the approach of Cachin et al. [4]. We define and implement asymmetric strong
Byzantine consensus protocol in Section 6 by extending the randomized consensus algorithm of Moste´faoui et
al. [21]. Randomization in the algorithm is achieved through a common coin; we use a common coin based on
secret sharing that works in the asymmetric-trust model. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Related work
Flexible trust structures have recently received a lot of attention [6,9,11,16,17,19], primarily motivated by consen-
sus protocols for blockchains, as introduced by Ripple (www.ripple.com) and Stellar (www.stellar.org).
According to general idea behind these models, processes are free to express individual, subjective trust choices
about other processes, instead of adopting a common, global view of trust.
Damga˚rd et al. [9] define the basics of asymmetric trust for secure computation protocols. This model is
strictly more powerful than the standard model with symmetric trust and abandons the traditional global failure
assumption in the system. Moreover, they present several variations of their asymmetric-trust model and sketch
synchronous protocols for broadcast, verifiable secret sharing, and general multi-party computation.
Mazie`res [19] introduces a new model for consensus called federated Byzantine agreement (FBA) and uses it
to construct the Stellar consensus protocol [15]. In FBA, every process declares quorums slices – a collection of
trusted sets of processes sufficient to convince the particular process of agreement. These slices are subsets of a
quorum, which is a set of processes sufficient to reach agreement. More precisely, a quorum is defined as a set
of processes that contains one slice for each member, and all quorums constitute a federated Byzantine quorum
system (FBQS).
Byzantine quorum systems have originally been formalized by Malkhi and Reiter [18] and exist in several
forms; they generalize the classical quorum systems aimed at tolerating crashes to algorithms with Byzantine
failures. Byzantine quorum systems assume one global shared fail-prone structure.
A link between FBQS and Byzantine quorums system has been built by Garcı´a-Pe´rez and Gotsman [11], who
implement Byzantine reliable broadcast on an FBQS. They prove that a FBQS induces a Byzantine quorum system.
Asymmetric Byzantine quorum systems have been introduced by Cachin and Tackmann [6] and generalize
Byzantine quorum systems [18] to the model with asymmetric trust. This work also explores properties of asym-
metric Byzantine quorum systems and differences to the model with symmetric trust. In particular, Cachin and
Tackmann [6] distinguish between different classes of correct processes, depending on whether their failure as-
sumptions in an execution are correct. The standard properties of protocols are guaranteed only to so-called wise
processes, i.e., those that made the “right” trust choices. Protocols with asymmetric quorums are shown for Byzan-
tine consistent broadcast, reliable broadcast, and emulations of shared memory. In contrast to FBQS, asymmetric
quorum systems appear to be a natural extension of symmetric quorum systems.
Recently, Losa et al. [16] have formulated an abstraction of the consensus mechanism in the Stellar network
by introducing Personal Byzantine quorum systems (PBQS). In contrast to the other notions “quorums”, their
definition does not require a global intersection among quorums. This may leads to several separate consensus
clusters such that each one satisfies agreement and liveness on its own.
Another new approach for designing Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols has been introduced
by Malkhi et al. [17], namely Flexible BFT. This notion guarantees higher resilience by introducing a new alive-
but-corrupt fault type, which denotes processes that attack safety but not liveness. Malkhi et al. [17] also define
flexible Byzantine quorums that allow processes in the system to have different faults models. They differ from the
asymmetric quorums considered here.
The background for our first asymmetric consensus protocol is provided by the classical PBFT protocol of
Castro and Liskov [8], which actually implements the first Byzantine total-order broadcast abstraction for partially
synchronous systems. PBFT runs through a sequence of views, called epochs here. In each epoch, a designated
leader aims to reach consensus on a totally ordered sequence of values. If the leader does not achieve its goal, e.g.,
because it is malicious, a new epoch is started by every correct process with another leader. Milosevic et al. [20]
consider the consensus algorithm underlying PBFT in the context of weak interactive consistency (WIC). They
show how it is possible to express the algorithm in a concise way by using WIC. This consensus algorithm has also
been presented in a modular form by Cachin et al. [4].
Our second asymmetric consensus protocol, which is randomized and works in asynchronous networks, builds
on the binary consensus algorithm of Moste´faoui et al. [21]; their protocol proceeds in rounds, is signature-free,
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uses randomization, and has optimal resilience. Its random choices are implemented by a common coin according
to Rabin [23].
3 System model
Processes. We consider a system of N processes P = {p1, . . . , pN} that communicate with each other. The
processes interact by exchanging messages over reliable point-to-point links.
A protocol for P consists of a collection of programs with instructions for all processes. Protocols are pre-
sented in a modular way using the event-based notation of Cachin et al. [4].
Failures. A process that follows its protocol during an execution is called correct. On the other hand, a faulty
process may crash or deviate arbitrarily from its specification, e.g., when corrupted by an adversary; such pro-
cesses are also called Byzantine. We consider only Byzantine faults here and assume for simplicity that the faulty
processes fail right at the start of an execution.
Functionality. A functionality is an abstraction of a distributed computation, either a primitive that may be
used by the processes or a service that it will provide. Every functionality in the system is specified through its
interface, containing the events that it exposes to protocol implementations that may call it, and its properties,
which define its behavior. There are two kinds of events in an interface: input events that the functionality receives
from other abstractions, typically from an application that invokes its services, and output events, through which the
functionality delivers information or signals a condition. A process may react to a received event by changing its
state and triggering further events. The behavior of a functionality is usually stated through a number of properties
or through a sequential implementation. We assume there is a low-level functionality for sending messages over
point-to-point links between each pair of processes. In a protocol, this functionality is accessed through the events
of “sending a message” and “receiving a message.” Point-to-point messages are authenticated, delivered reliably,
and output in FIFO order among correct processes [4, 12].
Time and randomization. This work contains protocols using two different timing models.
The timing model considered in our first protocol is partial synchrony [10], in the sense that there is no a priori
bound on message delays and the processes have no synchronized clocks. However, there is a time (not known
to the processes) after which message delays and processing times are bounded by finite values not known by the
processes.
Subsequently, in Section 6, we consider an asynchronous system, where processes have no access to any kind
of physical clock, and there is no bound on processing or communication delays. The randomized consensus
algorithms delegates its probabilistic choices to a common coin abstraction [23]; this is a distributed object that
delivers the same sequence of random binary values to each process, where each binary value has the value 0 or 1
with probability 12 .
4 Asymmetric Byzantine quorum systems
Before exploring asymmetric quorum systems and Byzantine consensus in this model, let us recall symmetric
Byzantine quorums as originally introduced [18].
4.1 Symmetric trust
Definition 1 (Fail-prone system). Let P be a set of processes. A fail-prone system F is a collection of subsets of
P , none of which is contained in another, such that some F ∈ F with F ⊆ P is called a fail-prone set and contains
all processes that may at most fail together in some execution.
Definition 2 (Byzantine quorum system). Let P be a set of processes and let F ⊆ 2P be a fail-prone system. A
Byzantine quorum system for F is a collection of sets of processesQ ⊆ 2P , where eachQ ∈ Q is called a quorum,
such that:
Consistency:
∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q,∀F ∈ F : Q1 ∩Q2 6⊆ F.
Availability:
∀F ∈ F : ∃ Q ∈ Q : F ∩Q = ∅.
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For example, under the common threshold failure model, the quorums are all sets of dN+f+12 e processes,
where f is the number of processes that may fail. In particular, if N = 3f + 1, quorums have 2f + 1 processes.
Malkhi and Reiter [18] refer to the above definition as Byzantine dissemination quorum system. They also
define other variants of Byzantine quorum systems.
We say that a set system T dominates another set system S if for each S ∈ S there is some T ∈ T such that
S ⊆ T . In this sense, a quorum system for F is minimal whenever it does not dominate any other quorum system
for F .
Definition 3 (Q3-condition [13, 18]). Let F be a fail-prone system. We say that F satisfies the Q3-condition,
abbreviated as Q3(F), if it holds
∀F1, F2, F3 ∈ F : P 6⊆ F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3.
This is the generalization of the threshold condition N > 3f for Byzantine quorum systems. Let S =
{P \ S|S ∈ S} be the bijective complement of a set S ⊆ 2P .
Lemma 1 (Quorum system existence [18]). Let F be a fail-prone system. A Byzantine quorum system for F
exists if and only if Q3(F). In particular, if Q3(F) holds, then F , the bijective complement of F , is a Byzantine
quorum system called canonical quorum system of F .
Note that the canonical quorum system is not always minimal. The canonical asymmetric quorum system will
play a role in Section 6.
Given a symmetric Byzantine quorum systemQ, we define a kernel K as a set of processes that overlaps with
every quorum and that is minimal in this respect. A kernel generalizes a core set [14].
Definition 4 (Kernel system). A set K ⊆ P is a kernel of a quorum system Q whenever it holds:
Consistency:
∀Q ∈ Q,K ∩Q 6= ∅.
Furthermore, one can also ask for
Minimality:
∀K ′ ( K,∃ Q ∈ Q : K ′ ∩Q = ∅.
We define the kernel system K of Q to be the set of all kernels of Q.
For example, under a threshold failure assumption where any f processes may fail, every set of
⌊
n−f+1
2
⌋
processes is a kernel. In particular, N = 3f + 1 if and only if every kernel has f + 1 processes.
Lemma 2. For every F ∈ F and for every quorum Q ∈ Q there exists a kernel K ∈ K such that K ⊆ Q.
Proof. Let Q be a quorum system for F and let F ∈ F . From the consistency property of a quorum system we
have that for all Q1, Q2 ∈ Q it holds Q1 ∩Q2 6⊆ F . Then, the set K = Q1 \ F ⊆ Q1 intersects all quorums in Q
and is a kernel of Q.
4.2 Asymmetric trust
The following definitions were initially introduced by Cachin and Tackmann [6].
In the asymmetric-trust model, every process is free to make its own trust assumption, expressing it with a
fail-prone system.
Definition 5 (Asymmetric fail-prone system). An asymmetric fail-prone system F = [F1, . . . ,Fn] consists of an
array of fail-prone systems, where Fi ⊆ P denotes the trust assumption of pi.
One often assumes pi 6∈ Fi for practical reasons, but this is not necessary.
For a system A ⊆ 2P , let A∗ = {A′|A′ ⊆ A,A ∈ A} denote the collection of all subsets of the sets in A.
Definition 6 (Asymmetric Byzantine quorum system). Let F = [F1, . . . ,Fn] be an asymmetric fail-prone sys-
tem. An asymmetric Byzantine quorum system for F is an array of collections of sets Q = [Q1, . . . ,Qn], where
Qi ⊆ 2P for i ∈ [1, n]. The setQi ⊆ 2P is called the quorum system of pi and any set Qi ∈ Qi is called a quorum
(set) for pi such that:
Consistency: for all i, j ∈ [1, n]
∀Qi ∈ Qi,∀Qj ∈ Qj ,∀Fij ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗ : Qi ∩Qj 6⊆ Fij .
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Availability: for all i ∈ [1, n]
∀Fi ∈ Fi : ∃ Qi ∈ Qi : Fi ∩Qi = ∅.
The following condition generalizes the Q3-condition to the asymmetric-trust model.
Definition 7 (B3-condition [9]). Let F be an asymmetric fail-prone system. We say that F satisfies the B3-
condition, abbreviated as B3(F), whenever it holds for all i, j ∈ [1, n] that
∀Fi ∈ Fi,∀Fj ∈ Fj ,∀Fij ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗ : P 6⊆ Fi ∪ Fj ∪ Fij .
Theorem 3 (Existence of asymmetric quorum systems [6]). An asymmetric fail-prone system F satisfies B3(F)
if and only if there exists an asymmetric quorum system for F.
Definition 8 (Asymmetric kernel system). Let Q = [Q1, . . . ,Qn] be an asymmetric quorum system. An asym-
metric kernel system K is an array of collections of sets [K1, . . . ,Kn] such that each Ki is a kernel system of Qi.
We call a set Ki ∈ Ki a kernel for pi.
In traditional Byzantine quorum systems, under a symmetric-trust assumption, every process in the system
adheres to a global fail-prone system F and the set F of faults or corruptions occurring in a protocol execution is
in F . Given this common trust assumption, properties of a protocol are guaranteed at each correct process, while
they are not guaranteed for faulty ones. With asymmetric quorums, there is a distinction among correct processes
with respect to F , namely the correct processes that consider F in their trust assumption and those who do not.
Given a protocol execution, the processes are classified in three different types:
Faulty: A process pi ∈ F is faulty.
Naı¨ve: A correct process pi for which F 6∈ Fi∗ is called naı¨ve.
Wise: A correct process pi for which F ∈ Fi∗ is called wise.
Recall that all processes are wise under a symmetric-trust assumption. Protocols for asymmetric quorums
cannot guarantee the same properties for naı¨ve processes as for wise ones.
A useful notion for ensuring liveness and consistency for protocols is that of a guild. This is a set of wise
processes that contains at least one quorum for each member.
Definition 9 (Guild). Given a fail-prone system F, an asymmetric quorum systemQ for F, and a protocol execution
with faulty processes F , a guild G for F satisfies two properties:
Wisdom:
∀pi ∈ G : F ∈ Fi∗.
Closure:
∀pi ∈ G,∃ Qi ∈ Qi : Qi ⊆ G.
The following lemma shows that every two guilds intersect.
Lemma 4. In any execution with a guild G, there cannot exist two disjoint guilds.
Proof. Let P be a set of processes, G be a guild and F be the set of actually faulty processes. Furthermore, suppose
that there is another guild G′, with G ∩ G′ = ∅. Let pi ∈ G and pj ∈ G′ be two processes and consider a quorum
Qi ⊆ G for pi and a quorum Qj ⊆ G′ for pj . From the definition of an asymmetric quorum system it must hold
Qi ∩ Qj * F , with Qi ∩ Qj 6= ∅ and F ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗. It follows that there exists a wise process pk ∈ Qi ∩ Qj
with pk ∈ G and pk ∈ G′. Notice also that G and G′ both contain a quorum for pk.
Observe that the union of two guilds is a guild. It follows that every execution with a guild contains a unique
maximal guild Gmax. Analogously to the other asymmetric notions, for a given asymmetric fail-prone system, we
call the list of canonical quorum systems for all processes an asymmetric canonical quorum system.
Lemma 5. Let Gmax be the maximal guild for a given execution and let Q be the canonical asymmetric quorum
system. Then, there cannot be a quorum Qj ∈ Qj for any process pj consisting only of faulty processes.
Proof. Given an execution with F as set of faulty processes, suppose there is a guild Gmax. This means that for
every process pi ∈ Gmax, a quorum Qi ⊆ Gmax exists such that Qi ∩ F = ∅. It follows that for every pi ∈ Gmax,
there is a set Fi ∈ Fi such that F ⊆ Fi. Recall that since Q is a quorum system, B3(F) holds. From Definition 7,
we have that for all i, j ∈ [1, n], ∀Fi ∈ Fi,∀Fj ∈ Fj ,∀Fij ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗ : P 6⊆ Fi ∪ Fj ∪ Fij .
Assume that there is a process pj such that it exists a quorum Qj ∈ Qj for pj with Qj = F . This implies that
it exists Fj ∈ Fj such that Fj = P \ F .
Let Fi be the fail-prone system of pi ∈ Gmax such that F ⊆ Fi and let Fj = P \ F as just defined. Then,
Fi∪Fj∪Fij = P . This follows from the fact that Fi contains F and Fj = P\F . This contradicts theB3-condition
for F.
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Example 1. We show that it is possible for a wise process to be outside the maximal guild by considering a seven-
process asymmetric quorum system QC , defined through its fail-prone system FC . The diagram below shows
fail-prone sets as shaded areas and the notation nk in front of a fail-prone set stands for k out of the n processes in
the set. The operator ∗ for two sets satisfies A ∗ B = {A ∪B : A ∈ A, B ∈ B}.
FC :
F1 = Θ32({p2, p4, p5}) ∗ {p6} ∗ {p7}
F2 = Θ32({p3, p4, p5}) ∗ {p6} ∗ {p7}
F3 = Θ32({p1, p4, p5}) ∗ {p6} ∗ {p7}
F4 = Θ41({p1, p2, p3, p5}) ∗ {p6} ∗ {p7}
F5 = Θ41({p1, p2, p3, p4}) ∗ {p6} ∗ {p7}
F6 = Θ33({p1, p3, p7})
F7 = Θ33({p3, p4, p5})
3
2
3
2
3
2
4
1
4
1
F1
F2
F3
F4
F6
p2 p3 p4 p6p1 p5
F5
4
1
p7
F7
3
3
One can verify that B3(FC) holds; hence, let QC be the canonical quorum system of FC . With F = {p4, p5},
for instance, processes p1, p2, p3 and p7 are wise, p6 is naı¨ve, and the maximal guild is Gmax = {p1, p2, p3}. It
follows that process p7 is wise but outside the guild Gmax, because quorum Q7 ∈ Q7 contains the naı¨ve process p6.
QC :
Q1 = {{p1, p3, p5}, {p1, p3, p4}, {p1, p2, p3}}
Q2 = {{p1, p2, p5}, {p1, p2, p4}, {p1, p2, p3}}
Q3 = {{p2, p3, p5}, {p2, p3, p4}, {p1, p2, p3}}
Q4 = {{p1, p2, p3, p4}, {p1, p2, p4, p5}, {p1, p3, p4, p5}, {p2, p3, p4, p5}}
Q5 = {{p1, p2, p3, p5}, {p1, p2, p4, p5}, {p1, p3, p4, p5}, {p2, p3, p4, p5}}
Q6 = {{p2, p4, p5, p6}}
Q7 = {{p1, p2, p6, p7}}
5 Asymmetric Byzantine leader-driven consensus
In a Byzantine consensus primitive, every correct process proposes a value v for consensus by invoking propose(v),
which typically triggers the start of the protocol among processes; it obtains as output a decided value v through
decide(v). There are no assumptions made about the faulty processes.
Consensus abstractions satisfy four properties, namely termination, validity, integrity and agreement. With
symmetric trust, the termination and integrity properties together imply that every correct process decides exactly
once. The validity property ensures that a decided value is a value that has been proposed by some process and the
agreement property states that no correct process decides differently. Moreover, the validity property of Byzantine
consensus can be formulated in two different ways, which are called weak validity and strong validity. Weak
validity requires that if all processes are correct and propose the same value v, then no correct process decides a
value different from v. Furthermore, if all processes are correct and some process decides v, then v was proposed
by some process. Strong validity, on the other hand, asks that if all correct processes propose the same value v,
then no correct process decides a value different from v. Otherwise, a correct process may only decide a value that
was proposed by some correct process [4].
In this section, we consider weak Byzantine consensus and generalize weak Byzantine consensus to asymmet-
ric trust. This notion is called asymmetric weak Byzantine consensus and restricts some properties of consensus
to wise processes, from all correct ones. In particular, weak validity and agreement need only hold for wise pro-
cesses and termination requires the existence of a guild, but only processes in the maximal guild are guaranteed to
terminate. Similar restrictions have been found necessary for other primitives with asymmetric trust [6].
Definition 10 (Asymmetric weak Byzantine consensus). A protocol for asymmetric weak Byzantine consensus
satisfies:
Termination: In all executions with a guild, every process in the maximal guild eventually decides some value.
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Weak validity: If all processes are wise and propose the same value v, then no process decides a value different
from v; furthermore, if all processes are wise and a value v is decided, then v was proposed by some process.
Integrity: No correct process decides twice.
Agreement: No two wise processes decide differently.
Notice that a naı¨ve process may have “wrong” assumptions about corrupted processes in the execution. The
termination and integrity properties imply that every process in the maximal guild decides exactly once. The
validity property ensures that, if all processes are wise, then the decided value is a value that has been proposed
was by some process. Finally, the agreement property states that no wise process decides differently.
To implement asymmetric Byzantine consensus, we consider the consensus mechanism underlying PBFT [8]
for a single decision, as presented by Cachin et al. [4]. Based on it, we build weak Byzantine consensus with
asymmetric quorum systems. Our consensus protocol causes the processes to execute a sequence of epochs, each
one uniquely identified by an increasing timestamp and a deterministically chosen leader, as in the PBFT protocol
for total-order broadcast, where these epochs are called views. The succession of epochs is driven by an epoch-
change primitive, presented in Section 5.1, responsible for triggering sequence of epochs at all processes. For
each epoch, a distinct epoch-consensus primitive is instantiated, which attempts to reach consensus, but is only
guaranteed to terminate when the leader is correct and the system is sufficiently synchronous. This is presented
in Section 5.2. Every process runs at most one epoch-consensus at a time and initializes an epoch with a higher
timestamp than that of all epochs that it has initialized previously. Finally, Section 5.3 gives the leader-driven
consensus primitive that orchestrates the two primitives presented up to that point and implements asymmetric
consensus.
5.1 Byzantine epoch-change
The following primitive indicates that a new epoch with timestamp ts and leader p` is started. It does so through
a startepoch(ts, p`) event. Timestamps in the sequence of epochs that are started at one process are monotonically
increasing and every process receives the same leader for a given epoch timestamp. Furthermore, a process may
invoke complain(p`) complaining against the leader p`. Correct processes are assumed to complain like this
whenever they notice that the protocol does not make progress, i.e., does not decide.
Definition 11 (Asymmetric Byzantine leader-based epoch-change). A protocol for asymmetric Byzantine leader-
based epoch-change satisfies:
Monotonicity: If a correct process starts an epoch (ts, p`) and later starts an epoch (ts′, p′`) , then ts′ > ts.
Consistency: If a correct process starts an epoch (ts, p`) and another correct process starts an epoch (ts′, p′`) with
ts′ = ts, then p` = p′`.
Putsch resistance: In all executions with a guild, any process in the maximal guild in an epoch with leader p`
does not start a new epoch unless at least one process in the maximal guild has complained against the
leader p`.
Eventual leadership: In all executions with a guild, if no more processes in the maximal guild complain, then
there exists a last epoch (ts, p`) started at every process in the maximal guild.
These properties are aligned with other abstractions of the view concept in PBFT [8], e.g., as discussed by
Aublin et al. [1]
Monotonicity and consistency properties ensure that the timestamps in the sequence of epochs started at every
correct process are monotonically increasing and that the leader of each epoch is the same for every correct process.
If no more processes in the maximal guild complain, eventual leadership property guarantees that there is a last
epoch started at every process in the maximal guild. Observe that a wise process may not be sufficient for a change
of epoch; a wise process outside the maximal guild may not be in some quorum for processes inside the maximal
guild, e.g., as in Example 1. In this example, if p7 complains, no process pi ∈ Gmax will receive a kernel for itself
made by p7. Same argument is applied to putsch resistance property which ensures that at least one process in the
maximal guild has to complain in order for the processes in Gmax to start a new epoch.
Algorithm 1 implements part of the view-change mechanism of PBFT. In particular, the leader of an epoch
with timestamp ts is deterministically derived by a function from ts. Whenever a correct process complains against
the current leader, it broadcasts a NEWEPOCH message to all processes. For asymmetric quorums, the condition
of receiving more than f equal NEWEPOCH messages generalizes to receiving NEWEPOCH from a kernel Ki for
a process pi. A correct process begins to switch to the next epoch after receiving NEWEPOCH messages from a
kernel for itself. Once a correct process receives a quorum for itself of NEWEPOCH messages it starts the new
epoch.
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Algorithm 1 Asymmetric Byzantine leader-based epoch-change (code for pi).
State
lastts← 0: most recently started epoch
nextts← 0: timestamp of the next epoch
newepoch← [⊥]N : list of NEWEPOCH messages
upon event complain(p`) such that p` = leader(lastts) do
if nextts = lastts then
nextts← lastts + 1
send message [NEWEPOCH, nextts] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [NEWEPOCH, ts] from pj such that ts = lastts + 1 do
newepoch[j]← NEWEPOCH
upon exists ts such that {pj ∈ P| newepoch[j] = ts} ∈ Ki and nextts = lastts do
nextts← lastts + 1
send message [NEWEPOCH, nextts] to all pj ∈ P
upon exists ts such that {pj ∈ P| newepoch[j] = ts} ∈ Qi and nextts > lastts do
lastts← nextts
newepoch← [⊥]N
output startepoch(lastts, leader(lastts))
Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 implements asymmetric Byzantine epoch-change.
Proof. Monotonicity and consistency follow from the fact that timestamps of two successive epochs started by a
process differ by 1 and the leader of an epoch is deterministically derived from timestamps.
Putsch resistance holds because a new epoch is started by a process pi in the maximal guild only after all
processes in a quorum for pi have complained against the current leader. So, the consistency property of quorum
systems implies that at least one process in the maximal guild has complained against the leader.
Now we prove eventual leadership property. Notice that a process in the maximal guild Gmax sends a NEWE-
POCH message to start a new epoch whenever it complains against the leader of the current epoch. Suppose that a
process pi ∈ Gmax has started the last epoch and it has timestamp ts′. This process has received NEWEPOCH mes-
sages from the processes in some quorum Qi for itself, with timestamp ts′. Consider any other process pj ∈ Gmax.
Since pi and pj are both wise, F ∈ F∗i and F ∈ F∗j , and so F ∈ F∗i ∩ F∗j . Consider the set K = Qi \ F .
Note that K contains only correct processes. This set intersects every quorum of pj , and it is therefore a kernel for
pj . All processes in K have sent NEWEPOCH message with timestamp ts′ to pj and therefore pj eventually sends
NEWEPOCH with ts′ as well. Thus, all processes in the maximal guild eventually send a NEWEPOCH message to all
processes. Every process in Gmax therefore receives a quorum for itself of NEWEPOCH messages with timestamp
ts′ and starts epoch ts′ with leader p`, which is computed by a deterministic function from ts′. If no more processes
in Gmax complain against p`, then the last epoch is (ts′, p`). Observe that if a wise process not in Gmax complains,
the algorithm does not necessarily trigger a change of epoch for this process.
5.2 Byzantine epoch-consensus
In the following primitive, a leader p` may propose a value v for consensus by invoking ep-propose(v). The
epoch-consensus abstraction decides value v through a ep-decide(v) event. Every epoch-consensus primitive is
associated to a timestamp ts and a leader p`.
Any process may abort an epoch-consensus instance with timestamp ts by invoking abort and, in case of the
completion of an abort request, the epoch-consensus abstraction outputs an event aborted(state) with the internal
state state, which must be given to the next epoch-consensus instance by pi and it determines the internal state
of pi. Process pi must use this state to initialize the next epoch in which it participates and it initializes an epoch-
consensus instance only with a higher timestamp than that of all instances that it initialized previously. We call such
a sequence of epochs as well-formed. In the following, we assume every correct process executes a well-formed
sequence of epoch-consensus instances.
An epoch does not abort on its own, but aborts are triggered externally. Different processes may abort an
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epoch independently of each other at different times. A process will typically do this when it is not satisfied with
the progress of the protocol and the leader.
Definition 12 (Asymmetric Byzantine epoch-consensus). A protocol for asymmetric Byzantine epoch-consensus
with timestamp ts and leader p` satisfies:
Validity: If a wise process decides v, then v was proposed by the leader p′` of some epoch-consensus with time-
stamp ts′ ≤ ts and leader p′`.
Agreement: No two wise processes decide differently.
Integrity: Every correct process decides at most once.
Lock-in: If a wise process has decided v in an epoch-consensus with timestamp ts′ < ts, then no wise process
decides a value different from v.
Termination: In all executions with a guild, if the leader is wise and no process in the maximal guild aborts
epoch-consensus, then every process in the maximal guild eventually decides some value.
Abort behavior: When a correct process aborts epoch-consensus, it eventually will have completed the abort.
Algorithm 2–3 implements this notion. It follows an abstraction of PBFT’s view change and view protocol for
a single decision [4, Algorithm 5.17], but with asymmetric quorums. In the sequel we assume that a well-formed
sequence of asymmetric Byzantine epoch-consensus instances is executed; Algorithm 4 in Section 5.3 will do this.
Algorithm 2–3 is initialized with a value state, output by the most recently aborted epoch-consensus instance.
This state contains (valts, val), the value that the process received most recently in a quorum for itself of WRITE
messages, during the epoch with timestamp valts, and a set writeset of timestamp/value pairs with one entry for
every value that this process has ever written.
Every process maintains a vector states, with one entry per process and that the process tries to fill upon
starting epoch consensus. An entry of states may be defined and contains a state of a process or may be undefined
and contains UNDEFINED. In every defined entry there is a timestamp ts, a value v and a set of timestamp/value
pairs, representing the writeset of the corresponding process. We say that states binds ts to v for process pi, writing
bindsi(ts, v, states), whenever both the following properties hold:
1. The timestamp/value pair (ts, v) appears in an entry of states and contains the largest timestamp among
some quorum Qi for pi of entries in states, i.e.,
{pj ∈ P | states[j] = [ts′, v′, ·] ∧ ts′ < ts ∨ (ts′, v′) = (ts, v)} ∈ Qi;
2. The writeset stored in states for every process in a kernel for pi contains v together with the highest time-
stamp, i.e.,
{pj ∈ P| states[j] = [·, ·,ws′] ∧ ∃ (ts′, v′) ∈ ws′ such that ts′ ≥ ts ∧ v′ = v} ∈ Ki.
Moreover, we say that states is unbound for process pi, writing unboundi(states), whenever there exists a
quorum Qi for pi where every process in Qi has timestamp equal to 0.
Algorithm 2–3 makes use of digital signatures. They are captured by a distributed oracle with two operations:
signi and verifysigi. The signi operation takes a bit string m as parameter and returns a signature σi with the
response. The verifysigi operation takes a bit string m and a putative signature σi as parameters and returns a
Boolean value b ∈ {TRUE, FALSE} with the response. Only process pi may invoke signi. Every process (including
the adversary) may invoke verifysigi without restriction on the parameters.
The algorithm works as follows. When the instance of epoch-consensus is initialized, every process sends
their states to the new leader to later determine if there exists a value that may have already been decided. This is
done by the leader setting its variable val to its proposal v` and sending a READ message to all the processes. This
triggers all processes to send their state, properly signed, to leader p`. The leader waits until receiving (properly
signed) states from a quorum Q` for itself such that sound`(states) holds. When this happens, it sends states
to every process. Every process collects states, verifies the correctness of the signatures of every entry of states
and checks if sound` on states holds. Moreover, if bind` on states, then process pi checks if property 2 of bind
holds among a kernel Ki for pi of defined entries in states. If states is unbound for p`, then process pi checks
if the defined entries of states with timestamp 0 define a kernel Ki for itself. If no value has been accepted in a
previous epoch-consensus instance, the processes start the epoch-consensus instance with the leader proposal v`.
Otherwise, they start the epoch-consensus instance with a value that has been already written in a previous epoch.
In both cases, every process sends a WRITE message with the starting value v (in tmpval) of the epoch-consensus
instance. Once a process pi receives a quorum Qi for itself of WRITE messages with the same value v, it sends
an ACCEPT message with value v to every process. Finally, when pi receives a quorum Qi for itself of ACCEPT
messages with the same value v, it decides for v.
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Algorithm 2 Asym. Byz. epoch-consensus with timestamp ts and leader p` (code for pi) – Part 1.
State
valts: timestamp of the current state of a process // taken from state on initialization
val: value of the current state of a process // taken from state on initialization
writeset: timestamp/value pairs that pi has ever written // taken from state on initialization
written← [⊥]N
accepted← [⊥]N
decided← FALSE: indicates whether pi has decided for a value
states← [UNDEFINED]N
Σ← [⊥]N : array of signatures for the state of a process pi
collected← FALSE: indicates whether pi has received states and Σ from p`
upon event ep-propose(v) do // only leader p`
if val =⊥ then val← v
send message [READ] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [READ] from p` do
σ ← signi([STATE, valtsi, vali,writeseti])
send message [STATE, valtsi, vali,writeseti, σ] to p`
upon receiving a message [STATE, valtsj , valj ,writesetj , σj ] from pj do // only leader p`
if verifysigj(valtsj , valj ,writesetj , σj) then
states[j]← [valtsj , valj ,writesetj ]
Σ[j]← σj
upon exists (tsj , vj ,wsj) such that {pj ∈ P|states[j] 6= UNDEFINED ∧ states[j] = [tsj , vj ,wsj ]} ∈ Q` and
sound`(states) do // only leader p`
send message [COLLECTED, states,Σ] to all pj ∈ P
states← [UNDEFINED]N
Σ← [⊥]N
upon receiving a message [COLLECTED, st, signatures] from p` such that ¬collected and sound`(st) and(∀pj ∈ P with st[j] 6= UNDEFINED it holds verifysigj(st[j], signatures[j])) do
collected← TRUE
tmpval←⊥
if exists tsj ≥ 0, vj 6=⊥ such that st[j] = (tsj , vj , ·) and bind`(tsj , vj , st) and // a kernel for pi
{pj ∈ P| st[j] = [·, ·,ws′] ∧ ∃ (ts′, v′) ∈ ws′ such that ts′ ≥ tsj ∧ v′ = vj} ∈ Ki then
tmpval← vj
else if exists v` 6=⊥ such that unbound`(st) ∧ st[`] = [·, v`, ·] and // a kernel for pi
{pj ∈ P| st[j] = [ts′, ·, ·] ∧ ts′ = 0} ∈ Ki then
tmpval← v`
if tmpval 6=⊥ and exists tsj such that (tsj , tmpval) ∈ writeset then
writeset← writeset \ {(tsj , tmpval)}
writeset← writeset ∪ {(ts, tmpval)}
send message [WRITE, tmpval] to all pj ∈ P
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Algorithm 3 Asym. Byz. epoch-consensus with timestamp ts and leader p` (code for pi) – Part 2.
upon receiving a message [WRITE, v] from pj do
if written[j] =⊥ then
written[j]← v
upon exists v 6=⊥ such that {pj ∈ P| written[j] = v} ∈ Qi do // a quorum for pi
(valts, val)← (ts, v)
written← [⊥]N
send message [ACCEPT, val] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [ACCEPT, v] from pj do
if accepted[j] =⊥ then
accepted[j]← v
upon exists v such that {pj ∈ P| accepted[j] = v} ∈ Qi and ¬decided do // a quorum for pi
decided← TRUE
accepted← [⊥]N
output ep-decide(v)
upon input abort do
output aborted(valtsi, vali,writeseti)
halt // stop when aborted
Theorem 7. Algorithm 2–3 implement Byzantine epoch-consensus with asymmetric quorum systems.
Proof. We start proving the lock-in property. Suppose that some wise process has decided v in an epoch-consensus
instance with ts′ < ts. A wise process decides only after collecting ACCEPT messages containing v from all the
processes in some quorum Qi. From the algorithm, every process in Qi \ F has set (valts, val) ← (ts′, v) and
has sent an ACCEPT message containing v to every process. Processes pj in Qi only send ACCEPT message after
receiving WRITE messages containing v from all the processes in some quorum Qj . Every process in Qj \ F has
added (ts′, v) to its writeset. Observe that sets Qi \ F = A and Qj \ F = W are kernels of correct processes for
pi and pj , respectively. Consider the next instance ts∗ of Byzantine epoch-consensus with timestamp ts∗ > ts, in
which any wise process pi received states from p` such that binds`(ts∗, v∗, states) for some v∗ 6=⊥, value v∗ is
in the writeset of at least a kernel Ki of correct processes for pi and such that no wise process has sent a WRITE
message in any epoch between ts′ and ts∗. We show that v∗ = v. Every process in A starts the new epoch with
its state containing (valts, val) = (ts′, v) and every process inW starts the new epoch with a variable writeset that
contains (ts′, v). Array states for pi satisfies binds`(ts′, v, states) and property 2 holds for pi because the writesets
of all processes in W include (ts′, v). Consequently, a wise process pi writes v and any other wise process that
writes, also writes v. So, a wise process can only decide v in epoch ts∗.
The agreement property comes from quorum intersection property. In fact, any wise process that decides v
must have received v from all the processes in some quorumQi for itself. As wise processes only send one ACCEPT
message and any two quorums intersect, it is not possible that another wise process pj has received a quorum Qj
for itself of messages with a different value v′.
The integrity property follows from the algorithm.
For the validity property, assume that a wise process decides v. As showed in lock-in property, a wise process
decides for v after receiving an ACCEPT message from all processes in some quorumQi for itself and every process
in Qi only sends an ACCEPT message after receiving v in a WRITE message from all processes in some quorum
Qj for itself. Furthermore, any wise process only sends a WRITE message with v either after collecting an array
states of states that binds ts to v for p` and property 2 of bind holds for pi among defined entries of states or after
collecting states that is unbound for p` and taking v from states[`], with leader p`. From second case, validity
property easily follows, while from first case it is possible to backward iterate the reasoning until reaching an
epoch where states is unbound. So, v was proposed by a leader in some epoch with ts′ ≤ ts.
For termination property, we show that if the leader is wise and no process in the maximal guild Gmax aborts
its epoch-consensus, then every process in Gmax eventually decides some value. Let us assume that every correct
process sends a STATE message containing its (properly signed) state to the leader after receiving from it a READ
message. Suppose the state of a process pi ∈ Gmax contains a pair (ts, v) which is either (0,⊥) or was assigned
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after receiving WRITE messages from all processes in some quorum Qi in epoch ts. In the latter case, if states
contains this pair then states cannot be unbound for the leader. Assume that this pair has the maximum timestamp
in the state of every process in a quorum Q` for p`. Also, v is in the writeset of at least a kernel Ki = Qi \ F
of correct processes for pi, since it was sent in a WRITE message by all processes in some quorum. Observe
that Ki is also a kernel for every other wise process, including the leader. Hence states binds ts to v for leader p`.
Alternatively, if all wise processes send to p` their state with timestamp 0, the algorithm can find an unbound states
for leader p`. Moreover, if any process pi ∈ Gmax receives states from p` such that states binds ts to v for process
p` and among defined entries of states there exists a kernel Ki for pi such that v occurs in the writeset of every
process inKi, then pi assigns tmpval 6=⊥ and sends a WRITE message containing tmpval. From kernel consistency
property, then v is the same for every process in the maximal guild. Otherwise, if any process pi ∈ Gmax receives
states from p` such that unbound`(states) and it exists a kernel Ki for pi among defined entries of states where
every process in Ki has timestamp equal to 0, then pi assigns tmpval 6=⊥ with leader proposal and sends a WRITE
message containing tmpval. Eventually, every process in the maximal guild assigns tmpval 6=⊥ and sends a WRITE
message containing tmpval. Then every process in the maximal guild sends an ACCEPT message to all processes
with their value. Eventually, every process in the maximal guild decides.
The abort behavior property is satisfied because the algorithm returns an aborted event immediately and only
if it has been aborted.
5.3 Asymmetric leader-driven consensus
Algorithm 4 below connects the epochs to each other and implements asymmetric weak Byzantine consensus. It
proceeds as follows.
The leader of an epoch aims at reaching consensus in its epoch among the processes. If the leader is wise,
and no further epoch starts, then consensus will be reached. Since one epoch might be aborted, the consensus
algorithm will invoke multiple epoch-consensus instances in sequence, driven by the outputs of epoch-change.
The value decided by consensus is the value that is decided by one of the epoch-consensus instances.
A correct process periodically gives feedback when the leader does not perform well because of possible faulty
leaders, e.g., whenever the leader of an epoch takes too long before deciding. In particular, at the beginning of every
epoch, every correct process starts a timer service with an estimation T of how long the epoch should take before
deciding. If the timeout expires before the epoch instance decides, then the process complains about the current
leader to the epoch-change primitive. Once sufficiently many processes in the maximal guild have complained, the
epoch-change primitive triggers an abort of the current epoch and invokes the next one. The timeout is initialized
to the same constant T0 by each process and doubles whenever a new epoch starts.
Theorem 8. Algorithm 4 implements asymmetric weak Byzantine consensus.
Proof. For the termination property, observe that the algorithm invokes a well-formed sequence of epoch-consensus
instances because of the properties of the epoch-change primitive. A new epoch-consensus instance is initialized
after the previous one has aborted. Furthermore, the eventual leadership property of epoch-change states that, if no
more processes in the maximal guild complain, then there is a time after which every process in the maximal guild
has started some epoch and starts no further epoch, such that the last epoch started at every process in the maximal
guild is epoch (ts, p`). Observe that a wise process pi complains against the current leader also if the leader does
not behave according to the trust structure of pi. This implies that the leader of the last started epoch is wise or it
behaves as it was a wise. After epoch with timestamp ts no process in the maximal guild starts a new epoch and the
termination property of the epoch-consensus primitive ensures that every process in the maximal guild eventually
decides some value. The property follows.
For the weak validity property, recall that a process decides a value v only when it has decided v in the current
epoch-consensus. Every decision comes from a unique epoch and from a unique epoch-consensus instance. Let
ts∗ be the smallest timestamp of such an epoch-consensus instance in which some process in the maximal guild
decides v. According to validity property of the epoch-consensus primitive, v was proposed by the leader of some
epoch with timestamp at most ts∗. The leader only proposes a value v for the epoch-consensus when v has been
proposed for consensus. So, if all processes are wise and a value v is decided, v has been proposed by some
process. Furthermore, from the properties of the underlying epoch-consensus primitive it is straightforward to
verify that if all processes are wise and propose the same value v, then the leader of the epoch with timestamp ts∗
proposes v and every process decides for v.
The integrity property follows from the decided flag, which prevents multiple decisions.
For the agreement property, observe that every decision by the algorithm comes from the decision of some
epoch-consensus instance. The agreement property of the epoch-consensus primitive ensures that if two wise
processes decide when they are in the same epoch, the decision is the same. Furthermore, if they decide in different
epochs then the property follows from the the lock-in property of epoch-consensus.
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Algorithm 4 Asymmetric leader-driven consensus (code for pi).
State
val←⊥
proposed← FALSE
decided← FALSE
(ts, p`)← (0, p1): initial epoch with timestamp 0 and leader p1
(newts, newp`)← (0,⊥): initial state
T ← T0: duration of timeout
upon event propose(v) do
val← v
upon event startepoch(newts′, newp`′) do
(newts, newp`)← (newts′, newp`′)
invoke abort
upon event aborted(state) from epoch-consensus instance ts do
(ts, p`)← (newts, newp`)
proposed← FALSE
T ← 2T
Restart timer with timeout T
Initialize a new instance of epoch-consensus with timestamp ts, leader p` and state state
upon p` = pi ∧ val 6=⊥ ∧ ¬proposed do
proposed← TRUE
invoke ep-propose(val)
upon event ep-decide(v) from epoch-consensus instance ts do
if ¬decided then
decided← TRUE
output decide(v)
upon event timeout do
output complain(p`)
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6 Asymmetric randomized Byzantine consensus
After presenting a partially synchronous asymmetric Byzantine consensus protocol in the previous section, we
now consider an asynchronous system and implement asymmetric randomized consensus. This primitive provides
strong validity, which means that a correct process may only decide a value that was proposed by some correct
process. Our asymmetric strong Byzantine consensus uses a system enriched with randomization.
Observe that when working with randomized consensus, one has to formulate the termination property proba-
bilistically. In round-based consensus algorithms, the termination property is formulated with respect to the round
number r that a process executes. It requires that the probability that a correct process decides after executing
infinitely many rounds approaches 1. In the asymmetric model, this can be guaranteed only for processes in the
maximal guild Gmax.
Definition 13 (Asymmetric strong Byzantine consensus). A protocol for asynchronous asymmetric strong Byzan-
tine consensus satisfies:
Probabilistic termination: In all executions with a guild, every process in the maximal guild decides with prob-
ability 1, in the sense that
lim
r→+∞(P[pi ∈ Gmax decides by round r]) = 1.
Strong validity: A wise process only decides a value that has been proposed by some wise process.
Integrity: No correct process decides twice.
Agreement: No two wise processes decide differently.
We implement asymmetric strong Byzantine consensus by building on the randomized consensus algorithm of
Moste´faoui et al. [21], which has optimal resilience. This round-based protocol works without digital signatures
and does not assume a computationally limited adversary.
Common Coin. Our randomized consensus algorithm delegates its probabilistic choices to a common coin
abstraction [4, 23], a random source observable by all processes but unpredictable for an adversary. A common
coin is invoked at every process by triggering a release-coin event. We say that a process releases a coin because
its value is unpredictable before the first correct process invokes the coin. The value s ∈ B of the coin with tag r
is output through an event output-coin.
Definition 14 (Asymmetric common coin). A protocol for asymmetric common coin satisfies the following prop-
erties:
Termination: In all executions with a guild, every process in the maximal guild eventually outputs a coin value.
Unpredictability: Unless at least one correct process has released the coin, no process has any information about
the coin output by a wise process.
Matching: In all executions with a guild, with probability 1 every process in the maximal guild outputs the same
coin value.
No bias: The distribution of the coin is uniform over B.
An asymmetric common coin has an output domainB (that we consider to be {0, 1}). The termination property
guarantees that every process in the maximal guild eventually output a coin value that is ensured to be the same
for each of them by the matching property. The unpredictability property ensures that the coin value is kept secret
until a correct process releases the coin. Finally, the no bias property specifies the probability distribution of the
coin output.
Implementing an asymmetric common coin. Our implementation of a common coin in the asymmetric-
trust model relies on the scheme of Benaloh and Leichter [2]. Their construction implements a secret-sharing
scheme for any monotone access structure. Furthermore, following the approach started by Rabin [23], we assume
that coins are predistributed by an ideal dealer using secret-sharing, in a way that for every round r there is exactly
one coin with value s ∈ {0, 1} and a tag r. Specifically, given an asymmetric quorum system Q and an ideal
dealer, the dealer creates the shares for the unique random coin values s ∈ {0, 1} with tags r independently for
each quorum Qi = {pi1 , . . . , pim} ∈ Qi of Q and it gives the shares to every process. This ensures that every
process pi is able to reconstruct the coin value using one of its quorums Qi.
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To share one coin value for a quorum Qi, the dealer chooses m − 1 random bits si1 , . . . , sim−1 , sets sim
such that sim = s +
∑m−1
j=1 sij mod 2, and gives the bit sij to pij . Any quorum can reconstruct the secret by
computing the sum modulo 2 of the shares. This procedure is done for each quorum in every quorum system of
Q. Furthermore, the dealer authenticates the shares, preventing Byzantine processes to send inconsistent bits to
other processes in the quorum. Correctness of this protocol follows from the correctness of the above mentioned
protocols. It follows that every wise process can reconstruct the secret and output the same coin value. On the
other end, the Byzantine processes cannot recover the secret without receiving at least one share from a correct
process. This follows from Lemma 5 in every execution with a guild, because there is no quorum for any process
consisting only of faulty processes.
This implementation is expensive because the number of shares for one particular coin held by a process pi
is equal to the number of quorums in which pi is contained. In practical systems, one may also implement an
asymmetric coin “from scratch” according to the direction taken by Canetti and Rabin [7] or recently by Patra et
al. [22]. Alternatively, distributed cryptographic implementations appear to be possible, for example, as introduced
by Cachin et al. [5].
6.1 Asymmetric binary validated broadcast
The binary validated broadcast primitive under a symmetric-trust model has been introduced by Moste´faoui et
al. [21] under the name binary-value broadcast1 as a building block for randomized Byzantine consensus. We
generalize it to the asymmetric-trust model.
In this primitive, every process may broadcast a binary value b ∈ {0, 1} by invoking abv-broadcast(b). The
broadcast primitive outputs at least one value b and possibly also both binary values through an abv-deliver(b)
event, according to the following notion. It restricts most of its safety properties to wise processes and requires a
guild for liveness.
Definition 15 (Asymmetric binary validated broadcast). A protocol for asymmetric binary validated broadcast
satisfies the following properties:
Validity: In all executions with a guild, if there exists a kernel Ki for a process pi in the maximal guild and
every process in Ki has abv-broadcast the same value b ∈ {0, 1}, then every process in the maximal guild
eventually abv-delivers b.
Integrity: If a wise process abv-delivers some b, then b has been abv-broadcast by some wise process.
Agreement: In all executions with a guild, if a wise process abv-delivers some value b, then every process in the
maximal guild eventually abv-delivers b.
Termination: In all executions with a guild, every process in the maximal guild eventually abv-delivers some
value.
One can implement asymmetric binary validated broadcast from the protocol introduced for symmetric (thresh-
old) quorum systems [21], as shown in Algorithm 5.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 5 implements asymmetric binary validated broadcast.
Proof. To prove the validity property, let us consider a kernel Ki for a process pi ∈ Gmax. Assume that every
process in Ki has abv-broadcast b. According to the protocol, pi therefore sends [VALUE, b] unless sentvalue[b] =
TRUE. However, if sentvalue[b] = TRUE, pi has already sent [VALUE, b]. Hence, every process in the maximal
guild eventually sends [VALUE, b]. Then, every process in Gmax receives a quorum for itself of values b and abv-
delivers b.
The integrity property is straightforward to verify from the algorithm. In fact, if a wise process abv-delivers b,
it has obtained a message [VALUE, b] from a quorum Qi for itself. Among the processes in Qi there is a set
K = Qi \ F of correct processes that received a message [VALUE, b] with the same value b. The set K is a kernel
for pi and the integrity property follows from the consistency property of kernels.
To show agreement, suppose that a wise process pi has abv-delivered b. Then it has obtained [VALUE, b]
messages from the processes in some quorum Qi ∈ Qi and before from a kernel Ki = Qi \ F for itself of correct
processes. Each of correct process in Ki has sent [VALUE, b] message to all other processes. Consider any other
wise process pj . Since pi and pj are both wise, it holds F ∈ Fi∗ and F ∈ Fj∗, which implies F ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗. It
follows that Ki is also a kernel for every pj and so every pj has sent a [VALUE, b] message to every process. This
1We adjusted some conditions to standard terminology from [21] and chose to call the primitive “binary validated broadcast”
to better emphasize its aspect of validating the inputs.
15
Algorithm 5 Asymmetric binary validated broadcast (code for pi)
State
sentvalue← [FALSE]2: sentvalue[b] indicates whether pi has sent [VALUE, b]
values← [∅]N : list of sets of received binary values
upon event abv-broadcast(b) do
sentvalue[b]← TRUE
send message [VALUE, b] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [VALUE, b] from pj do
if b 6∈ values[j] then
values[j]← values[j] ∪ {b}
upon exists b ∈ {0, 1} such that {pj ∈ P| b ∈ values[j]} ∈ Ki and ¬sentvalue[b] do // a kernel for pi
sentvalue[b]← TRUE
send message [VALUES, b] to all pj ∈ P
upon exists b ∈ {0, 1} such that {pj ∈ P| b ∈ values[j]} ∈ Qi do // a quorum for pi
output abv-deliver(b)
implies that all processes in the maximal guild eventually receive a quorum for itself of [VALUE, b] messages and
abv-deliver b.
For the termination property, notice that in any execution, every correct process abv-broadcasts some binary
value. Notice also that by the consistency property of asymmetric quorum systems, there cannot be two quorums
Qi ∈ Qi and Qj ∈ Qj for pi and pj , respectively, such that every correct process in Qi has abv-broadcast b and
every correct process in Qj has abv-broadcast b′ 6= b. Furthermore let us assume w.l.o.g. that every quorum Qi
for a wise process pi contains some correct process that has abv-broadcast b. Then, the set B containing only the
correct processes that have abv-broadcast b intersects every Qi for pi. Notice that B it contains a set Ki ⊆ B such
that Ki is a kernel for pi. Termination then follows from the validity property.
6.2 Asymmetric randomized binary consensus
In the following primitive, a correct process may propose a binary value b by invoking arbc-propose(b); the con-
sensus abstraction decides for b through an arbc-decide(b) event.
Algorithm 6 proceeds in rounds, and in each round an instance of abv-broadcast is invoked. A correct process
pi executes abv-broadcast and waits for a value b identified by a tag characterizing the current round. Once
received, pi adds b to values, broadcasts b into a AUX message to all other processes and all of them add b to aux.
When pi has received a set B ⊆ values of values carried by AUX messages from all processes in a quorum Qi for
itself, then pi releases its coin with tag r. Then process pi waits for output-coin with tag r and the common coin
value s.
Subsequently, pi checks if there is a single value b in B. If so, and if b = s, then it decides for value b. The
process then proceeds to the next round with proposal b. If there is more than one value in B, then pi changes its
proposal to s. In any case, the process starts another round and invokes a new instance of abv-broadcast with its
proposal. Notice that the protocol appears to execute rounds forever, but standard mechanisms exist to actually
terminate the consensus protocol.
Theorem 10. Algorithm 6 implements asymmetric strong Byzantine consensus.
Proof. To prove the strong validity property, assume that a wise process pi has decided a value b in round r. This
means that B = {b} and b is the same as the coin value in round r. Then, pi has received b from a quorum Qi
for itself. Every process in Qi has received a [AUX, r, b] message and b ∈ values has been abv-delivered from
abv-broadcast instance. From the integrity property of abv-broadcast instance, b has been abv-broadcast by a wise
process and, specifically, values contains only values abv-broadcast wise processes. It follows that b has been
proposed by some wise process.
For the agreement property, suppose that a wise process has received [AUX, r, b] messages from a quorum Qi
for itself. Consider any other wise process pj that has received a quorum Qj for itself of [AUX, r, b¯] messages. If
at the end of round r there is only one value in B then from consistency property of quorum systems, it follows
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Algorithm 6 Asymmetric randomized binary consensus (code for pi).
State
round← 0: current round
values← {}: set of abv-delivered binary values for the round
aux← [{}]N : stores binary values that have been received in AUX messages in the round
upon event arbc-propose(b) do
invoke abv-broadcast(b) with tag round
upon abv-deliver(b) with tag r such that r = round do
values← values ∪ {b}
send message [AUX, round, b] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [AUX, r, b] from pj such that r = round do
aux[j]← aux[j] ∪ {b}
upon exists B ⊆ values such that B 6= {} ∧ {pj ∈ P |B = aux[j]} ∈ Qi do // a quorum for pi
release-coin with tag round
wait for output-coin(s) with tag round
round← round + 1
if exists b such that |B| = 1 ∧B = {b} then
if b = s then
output arbc-decide(b)
invoke abv-broadcast(b) with tag round // propose b for the next round
else
invoke abv-broadcast(s) with tag round // propose coin value s for the next round
values← [⊥]N
aux← [{}]N
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b = b¯. Furthermore, if b = s then pi and pj decide for b otherwise they both abv-broadcast(b) and they continue
to abv-broadcast(b) until b = s. If B contains more than one value, then pi and pj proceed to the next round and
invoke a new instance of abv-broadcast with s. Therefore, at the beginning of the next round, the proposed values
of all wise processes are equal. The property easily follows.
The integrity property is easily derived from the algorithm.
The probabilistic termination property follows from two observations. First, from the termination property of
abv-broadcast it follows that no processes in the maximal guild ever receives a binary value from the abv-broadcast
instance. Second, we show that with probability 1, there exists a round at the end of which all processes in Gmax
have the same proposal b. Then the claim follows because every process in the maximal guild invokes another
abv-broadcast instance with proposal b. If at the end of round r, every process in Gmax has proposed the coin value,
then they also all of them start the next round with the same value. However, it could be the case that some wise
process proposes b and another one proposes the coin output s. Observe that the properties of the common coin
abstraction guarantee that the coin value is random and independently chosen. So, the random value s is equal to
the proposal value b with probability 12 . The probability that there exists a round r
′ in which the coin equals the
value b proposed by all processes in Gmax during round r′ approaches 1 when r goes to infinity. Let r thus be some
round in which every process in Gmax abv-broadcasts the same bit b; then, none of them will ever change their
proposal again. This is due to the fact that every wise process invokes an abv-broadcast instance with the same
proposal b. According to the validity and agreement properties of asymmetric binary validated broadcast, every
process in the maximal guild then delivers the same, unique value b. Hence, the proposal of every process in the
maximal guild is set to b and never changes. Finally, the properties of common coin guarantee that with probability
1 the processes eventually reach a round in which the coin outputs b. Therefore, with probability 1 every process
in the maximal guild decides the value b.
7 Conclusion
As we show in this work, consensus protocols with asymmetric trust can be obtained by starting from existing, well-
known protocols with symmetric trust. But we have no assurance that this is also the case for further traditional
algorithms. Understanding subjective trust and implementing the corresponding protocols remains an interesting
open problem, especially with respect to cryptographic constructions.
Moreover, while it has been shown that the existence of asymmetric quorums is characterized by the B3-
condition, it remains open how such a structure might arise spontaneously in a dynamic system, where processes
join and leave without knowledge of each other. One particular issue to consider is a Byzantine process that de-
clares a fail-prone system with the sole aim of sabotaging theB3-condition. Achieving a complete characterization
of asymmetric quorum systems and the corresponding protocols would allow to have systems with open and dy-
namic membership, in which the participants do not need to know each other from the start but still benefit from
strong consistency guarantees.
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